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DISCRETION 
BRIAN J. SHEARER∗ 
The Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. undermined the controversial Alaska Hunters doctrine by stating that 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) treats initial and subsequent agency 
actions in the same way.  Applied to rulemaking, Fox would have the APA 
treat initial regulatory interpretations and subsequent revisions of those 
interpretations in the same way, in direct conflict with the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine’s requirement of notice and comment for certain revisions. 
At the same time that the Supreme Court undermined this restriction on 
agency discretion, the Court provided a possible replacement:  substantive 
arbitrary and capricious review that can be applied to interpretive rulemaking.  
Using the arbitrary and capricious review in Fox, which requires (1) an 
explanation of why the agency changed, (2) a justification of why factors used 
in the previous interpretation were disregarded, and (3) an analysis on how 
reliance interests were considered, courts could police agency interpretive 
discretion by conducting a reasoned analysis of adjustments to regulatory 
interpretations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every so often, an individual can change the course of American 
history with a speech.  Some of history’s most revered Americans 
inspired the country into action through sheer oratory mastery, 
ushering in historic reforms with mere words.  Other times, a speech 
incites reform a little less directly:  “Have you ever tried to get cow 
s*** out of a Prada purse?  It’s not so f***ing simple.”1  Nicole 
Richie’s comments at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards started a 
chain of events ending in the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc.,2 which might finally provide a sufficient 
framework for analyzing how government agencies can change 
policy.  Sometimes, reform is accidental. 
The Administrative Procedure Act3 (APA) provides the default 
standards and procedures used by agencies to implement statutes.4  It 
                         
 1. Billboard Music Awards (FOX television broadcast Dec. 10, 2003). 
 2. 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 4. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96 n.4 (2003) (providing sources that explain 
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also establishes judicial review of agency action in order to restrain 
agency discretion and legitimize an otherwise constitutionally 
dubious “fourth branch” of government.5  In reviewing agency action, 
courts most often use the arbitrary and capricious standard,6 a 
standard that courts have interpreted and reinterpreted in often 
contradictory and confusing ways.7  This confusion has almost 
certainly encouraged the litigious nature of the modern 
administrative state.8  The confusion has also led to diverging U.S. 
courts of appeals’ interpretations of administrative law doctrines, 
forcing agencies to choose between uniform administration of 
statutes and obedience to differing regional judicial doctrines.9 
Additionally, ossification of rulemaking procedures further 
obstructs efficient administrative governance.  First used by Professor 
E. Donald Elliott in 1990,10 “ossification” has become a common topic 
in the study of administrative law.11  The theory contends that 
                                                          
the well-known legal evolution toward an administrative state that implements laws 
through agencies and not the judiciary). 
 5. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1727 (2011) (arguing that judicial review keeps the delegation 
of legislative and executive powers in check). 
 6. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (setting forth that courts should overturn agency 
actions meeting this standard). 
 7. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 499, 526–34 (2011) (asserting that there are agency-specific precedents 
regarding arbitrary and capricious analysis).  Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (suggesting that arbitrary 
and capricious review is “evasive,” but that the standard requires an articulated and 
rational decisionmaking process), with Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that arbitrary and capricious review must be 
“searching” but not a substitute of agency judgment).  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that it “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s 
path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974), but that courts may not provide a reasoned basis for 
an agency action if the agency did not provide one, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 196 (1947). 
 8. See Meazell, supra note 5, at 1743–69 (studying “serial cases” that continually 
cycle from agencies to the courts). 
 9. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 124–25 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf (finding 
that uncertainty in agency treatment of statutes is one of the most “intolerable” 
consequences of circuit conflicts in general). 
 10. According to Professor McGarity, Professor Elliot first referred to 
“ossification” in this context in a 1990 symposium at Duke Law School.  See Thomas 
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 
1385–86 (1992) (citing E. Donald Elliot, Remarks at the Duke University School of 
Law Symposium:  Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty 
Years:  Law, Politics, and Economics (Nov. 15, 1990)). 
 11. For a discussion and critique of the trend of ossification, see David L. 
Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE 
L.J. 276, 284 (2010), which discusses ossification but takes no position on it; 
McGarity, supra note 10, at 1386, which states that rulemaking requires so many 
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rulemaking has become increasingly burdensome for agencies due to 
congressionally-imposed and judicially-fabricated procedures.12  The 
term analogizes the incremental increase of bureaucracy to the cell-
by-cell growth of bone tissue.13  Ossifying procedures include impact 
analyses14 and substantive requirements for agencies to address all 
contingencies and comments.15  Though each procedure and 
requirement has value by itself, most scholars agree that the general 
trend is leading towards an excessively bureaucratic system.16  More 
costly and timely procedures make rulemaking more inefficient and 
rigid, encouraging agencies to avoid traditional policy-making 
strategies, like notice-and-comment rulemaking, and to favor less 
transparent policy-making tools, such as guidance documents or case-
by-case adjudication.17 
                                                          
procedures, analyses, and reviews that case-by-case adjudication may be superior; and 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 
60, 71 (1995), which lays out the problem of ossification and suggests remedies.  For 
rebuttals to the critiques of ossification, see William S. Jordan, III, Ossification 
Revisited:  Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To 
Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 397 
(2000), which argues that hard-look review, a commonly cited form of ossification, 
does not significantly impede agencies; and Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act:  A 
Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 307 
(2009), which contends that judicial review, and ossification in general, may be 
necessary to limit agency discretion. 
 12. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 283–84 (holding Congress, the President, and 
the courts responsible for making the rulemaking process “increasingly 
cumbersome”). 
 13. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1247 (5th ed. 
2011) (defining ossification as “[t]he natural process of bone formation”). 
 14. Various statutes require impact analyses.  E.g.,  Regulatory Flexibility Act 
§ 3(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 605(b) (2006) (requiring agencies to publish a regulatory 
flexibility analysis, and convene a panel of small business representatives, where a 
regulation would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (mandating an environmental impact analysis report for each 
regulation affecting the environment); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 § 2, 44 
U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1) (establishing that the Office of Management and Budget must 
analyze and approve any rule that would impose an information collection burden 
on ten or more persons). 
 15. See Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(holding that the intention of a basis and purpose statement is to respond to 
comments received and not just to address general policy issues); Auto. Parts 
& Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[T]he ‘concise 
general statement of . . . basis and purpose’ mandated by Section 4 will enable us to 
see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why 
the agency reacted to them as it did.”). 
 16. See sources cited supra notes 10–11 (providing scholarship supporting and 
criticizing the ossification theory). 
 17. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have sometimes 
improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory 
notice-and-comment requirements for agency rulemaking . . . .”); Todd D. Rakoff, 
The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 159, 166 (2000) (arguing that agencies avoid ossification by issuing guidance 
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The Alaska Hunters doctrine18 is one controversial example of an 
ossifying procedure.  The doctrine, which the federal courts of 
appeals have not universally adopted,19 establishes that agencies can 
alter certain interpretations of regulations only through notice-and-
comment procedures.20  According to the doctrine, if an 
interpretation that is initially published without notice and comment 
becomes definitive and engenders reliance, an agency may only 
amend that interpretation through notice-and-comment 
procedures.21  The doctrine is in conflict with the APA, which 
expressly exempts all interpretive rules from notice-and-comment 
requirements.22 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court overruled the 
Alaska Hunters doctrine sub silentio in Fox, that the Court provided an 
analysis that is more consistent with the plain language and Supreme 
Court interpretations of the APA than the Alaska Hunters doctrine, 
and that the Fox Court’s arbitrary and capricious review is a less 
burdensome model for policing interpretive agency rulemaking.  Part 
I briefly discusses agency rulemaking and the changing distinction 
between interpretive and legislative rules; Part I also outlines the 
current state of the Alaska Hunters doctrine and unravels the 
interwoven opinions in Fox.  Part II asserts that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fox overruled the infamous Alaska Hunters doctrine sub 
silentio by holding that the APA does not distinguish between initial 
and subsequent agency actions.  Part III argues that the arbitrary and 
capricious review in Fox—requiring an agency to explain why it 
changed policy, why it disregarded contradicting facts or factors, and 
how it considered reliance interests—should be applied to 
interpretive rulemaking.  Part III continues by arguing that the 
arbitrary and capricious analysis in Fox is a method for restricting 
agency interpretive rulemaking authority that is more consistent with 
                                                          
documents).  But see Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere?  Analyzing Agency Use of 
Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 820–23 (2010) (providing an empirical study 
that suggests that agencies do not use guidance documents to avoid notice-and-
comment rulemaking). 
 18. See Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit:  A Defense of 
Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 156 (2001) (coining the term 
“Alaska Hunters doctrine” in reference to the holding in Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n 
v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and its progeny). 
 19. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 
2010) (recognizing the circuit split); see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 9, at 
124–25 (discussing the problems of circuit splits in administrative law). 
 20. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034. 
 21. Id. at 1034–35; see Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 950 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (clarifying that reliance interests are necessary to challenge an 
interpretation using the Alaska Hunters doctrine). 
 22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006). 
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Supreme Court case law and the APA, and is more effective at 
limiting agency discretion than the Alaska Hunters doctrine. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The APA and Judicial Review of Agency Rules 
The APA establishes default standards for judicial review of both 
the substance and procedure of agency rulemaking.23  Typically, a 
court can overturn an agency rule if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or if the 
process for issuing the rule was invalid.24  Thus, courts both review 
the substance of a rule and ensure that the agency used the proper 
procedure to issue the rule. 
Due to the onerous requirements of formal rulemaking,25 Congress 
allows most agencies to issue rules through the informal notice-and-
comment procedure.26  Notice-and-comment procedures require 
agencies to publish notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register.27  The public then has a brief opportunity to provide 
comments either supporting or opposing the proposed rulemaking.28  
Agencies are required to address the comments in the final 
publication of the rule in the Federal Register.29 
Section 553(b)(A) explicitly exempts interpretive rules and general 
statements of policy from notice-and-comment procedures.30  The 
language of § 553(b)(A) has led to extensive litigation over what 
constitutes a legislative or substantive rule—requiring notice and 
comment—and what constitutes an interpretive rule or general 
statement of policy—requiring no specified APA procedures at all.31  
                         
 23. Id. §§ 551–559. 
 24. Id. § 706; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) 
(explaining that arbitrary and capricious review and procedural review are the main 
sources of judicial review outside of the typical jurisdictions of constitutional and 
statutory review). 
 25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (requiring hearings comparable to adjudication). 
 26. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) 
(holding that Congress intended formal rulemaking procedures to apply only to 
rulemakings that are required to be “on the record”); see also Franklin, supra note 11, 
at 282 (stating that Congress rarely requires rulemakings to be “on the record”). 
 27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 28. Id. § 553(c). 
 29. Id.; see also La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 
1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (calling for agencies to respond to comments that, if true, 
would require a change in the proposed rule). 
 30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
 31. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596–97 
(5th Cir. 1995) (arguing that the key inquiry to determining if a rule is legislative is 
whether it establishes a binding norm); Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 
(9th Cir. 1983) (stating that substantive rules affect an existing law or policy while 
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In theory, a rule is legislative if it creates a new binding norm, and a 
rule is interpretive if it merely clarifies an already established binding 
norm in a regulation or statute.32  In practice, however, agencies can 
use interpretive rules to change agency policy.33 
Even when an agency uses proper procedure, a court can still 
overturn agency rules that the court determines to be arbitrary and 
capricious.34  Given the dictionary definitions of “arbitrary”35 and 
“capricious,”36 one would suspect that agency rules are rarely 
overturned.  Courts, however, have overruled agency rules and orders 
of all types using a strict form of arbitrary and capricious review 
known as the hard-look test.37  Taking a “hard look,” courts can 
                                                          
interpretive rules only clarify existing law or regulations); see also William R. 
Andersen, Informal Agency Advice—Graphing the Critical Analysis, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 595, 
605–09 (2002) (providing an analysis of the differences between interpretive and 
legislative rules).  Interpretive rules and general statements of policy are typically 
referred to together as “non legislative rules.”  See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 11, at 286 
(explaining that the term aims to distinguish interpretive rules and policy statements 
from legislative rules). 
 32. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care, 56 F.3d at 596–600 (analyzing 
whether a rule created a binding norm by looking to the language of the rule and 
the manner in which it was implemented). 
 33. E.g., 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT:  AN FTC 
STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 8–12 (2011) (acknowledging five 
“significant” adjustments to previous interpretations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
that could be considered policy changes:  the Department of Motor Vehicles is no 
longer considered a “consumer reporting agency,” a report from a consumer 
reporting agency is now a “consumer report” even if it is used for commercial 
purposes, the analytical “joint user” concept is no longer endorsed by the FTC, 
anonymous consumer information that can be linked to consumers are now 
consumer reports, and consumer reporting agencies may disclose a P.O. box instead 
of an office address); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1705, 1711–12 & nn.42–45 (2007) (citing to scholarship indicating that some 
interpretations can be binding insofar as the interpretation is of a binding rule). 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 35. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 13, 
at 91 (“Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or 
principle.”). 
 36. See id. at 277 (“Characterized by, arising from, or subject to caprice; impulsive 
and unpredictable.”). 
 37. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374–78 (1989) (applying 
the hard look test to the Court’s arbitrary and capricious review of agency action 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (using a strict form of review, 
although not using the phrase “hard look”).  The Supreme Court never actually used 
the term “hard look” in State Farm, but commentators have suggested that State Farm 
endorsed the doctrine.  See, e.g., JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY 
RULEMAKING 481 (5th ed. 2012) (reporting that the Supreme Court has never used 
the phrase outside of NEPA cases).  Before Marsh and State Farm, “hard look” 
referred to how hard an agency must look when making policy, not how hard the court 
looks in determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.  See 
Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:  A Response to 
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 527–30 (1997) (providing a historical overview 
of the judiciary’s application of the hard-look test to explain the court’s role in 
migrating the hard-look test from applying to the agency to applying to the court). 
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reverse agency actions, including rules, if (1) an agency relied on 
facts that Congress did not intend for the agency to consider, (2) an 
agency failed to consider important aspects of the issue, (3) evidence 
raised before the agency contradicts the agency’s explanation for its 
decision, or (4) the explanation is so implausible that it cannot be 
ascribed to a difference of perspective.38 
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,39 the Court concluded that a court may not impose 
procedures on an agency unless specifically required in the APA or 
other governing statutes.40  This doctrine has limited judicial review 
of rulemaking—other than statutory and constitutional review—to 
substantive arbitrary and capricious review, and review of procedures 
that the APA mandates, namely, notice and comment.41 
B. Binding Legislative Rules, Interpretive Rules, and the Deference Granted 
to Agencies 
Courts have struggled with the distinction between legislative and 
interpretive rules for decades, but courts and commentators generally 
agree that a rule is legislative and must be issued through notice and 
comment if it is “binding” or has independent legal effect.42  
Recently, courts have characterized the distinction between legislative 
and interpretive rules as whether a rule establishes new law or is 
properly interpretive.43  However, this characterization is only a re-
articulation of the inquiry of whether a rule is independently 
binding.  A legislative rule is still defined as a rule that establishes 
“binding” norms and a rule interpreting its underlying regulation 
                         
 38. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 39. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 40. Id. at 545–48. 
 41. See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 344–45 (2011) (stating that the current legal 
landscape focuses on what constitutes a legislative rule that is subject to notice and 
comment and arguing that substantive review should be the focus). 
 42. See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[A] rule with the force 
and effect of law—binding not only the agency and regulated parties, but also the 
courts—is by definition a substantive rule.”); see also sources cited supra note 31 
(providing cases and articles that focus on the “binding” nature of a rule in 
determining whether it is legislative or interpretive). 
 43. See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (specifying that a 
clarification of a definition capturing the original intent of the rule is an interpretive 
rule); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a regulatory interpretation that is not sufficiently interpretive, in that it 
independently establishes new law, is not a valid interpretive rule). 
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would not be independently binding.44  Thus, the difficulty still lies in 
determining which rules are independently binding.45 
The definitional confusion over interpretive and legislative rules 
has been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the 
matter.  For example, in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,46 the 
Court held that an interpretive rule is invalid if it is inconsistent with 
the legislative rule it interprets, limiting its guidance on validity of 
interpretive rules to the most blatant circumstance—where a 
regulation and its interpretation conflict.47 
Additionally, in the related context of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations, the Court recently began linking the deference 
granted with the procedure used to issue an interpretation.  In United 
States v. Mead Corp.48 and Christensen v. Harris County,49 the Court ruled 
that courts should typically grant Skidmore deference50 to rules that 
are not issued through notice and comment.51  Skidmore deference 
requires that courts grant a small amount of deference to agency 
interpretations, proportionate to the interpretation’s power to 
persuade, because of agency expertise.52  Compared to the deference 
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 
Inc.,53 which requires deference to reasonable agency interpretations 
when a statute is ambiguous,54 Skidmore is a less deferential standard.55  
By establishing that courts only grant Skidmore deference, and not 
                         
 44. See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 169–70 (stating that an interpretive rule is only binding 
where the binding element is derived from a process that is “reasonably described as 
interpretation”). 
 45. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (declaring that an interpretive rule has “legal effect,” a synonym for 
binding effect, if in the absence of the interpretation there would be no basis for 
enforcing the legislative rule in accordance with that interpretation). 
 46. 514 U.S. 87 (1995). 
 47. Id. at 100. 
 48. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 49. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 50. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.”). 
 51. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–29 (ruling that tariff classifications were entitled to 
Skidmore deference); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (holding that interpretations that do 
not have the force of law, and that were not issued through formal adjudication or 
notice and comment, do not warrant Chevron deference). 
 52. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 54. See id. at 842–43 (establishing that a court will look first to the plain language 
of a statute, and if ambiguous, will then give deference to an agency interpretation). 
 55. See generally Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:  Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the 
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001) (analyzing the “weak” 
Skidmore deference and the stronger Chevron deference). 
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Chevron deference, to rules not issued through notice and comment, 
the Court began a trend of choosing the degree of deference based 
on the procedure the agency used to pass the rule.56  The court 
determines how much deference to grant to a rule by looking to the 
procedure the agency used to issue the rule, and a court is less 
deferential to an agency’s rule that is issued without notice and 
comment than to a rule that is issued through notice and comment.57 
The Supreme Court expounded on this doctrine in Barnhart v. 
Walton.58  In Walton, the Court stated that courts should rely heavily 
on the methods of interpretation that the agency employs and the 
substance of the question under consideration when determining 
whether to give Chevron deference.59  The Court essentially stated that 
Skidmore deference is not granted per se to rules issued without notice 
and comment, and that Chevron deference could be applied to 
interpretive rules issued without notice and comment where the 
agency thoroughly analyzed the issue.60 
Walton could lead one to believe that courts have begun adopting 
the approach of linking whether a rule is binding, and thus 
legislative, to procedure.61  For years, scholars have been proposing 
this approach, arguing that instead of determining whether a rule is 
legislative based on whether it is binding, a rule should simply be 
legislative and binding if it was issued through notice and comment, 
and interpretive but not binding if issued without notice and 
comment.62  The Walton Court’s movement towards using procedure 
                         
 56. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–29 (conditioning the deference owed in part on the 
procedure the agency used). 
 57. See id. (looking to whether a rule was issued through notice and comment to 
determine the appropriate degree of deference, and finding that the customs rule at 
issue failed to qualify for Chevron deference because Congress had not delegated 
authority to the Agency to make rules carrying the force of law); Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (basing the deference determination on the 
time and effort spent during the rulemaking procedure and concluding that an 
interpretation contained in an opinion letter warranted Skidmore deference, but not 
Chevron deference). 
 58. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 222. 
 60. See id. (holding that Chevron deference should be granted to an interpretative 
rule because of the presence of a statutory gap, the importance of the issue, the 
expertise of the agency, the complexity of the issue, and the careful consideration 
that the agency gave the question). 
 61. It is a general consensus among legal scholars that the courts have not 
adopted this new approach.  E.g., Franklin, supra note 11, at 279.  This Comment 
contends that the Supreme Court has been taking steps toward adopting the 
approach, and may already be applying it without fully explaining why.  At least one 
scholar agrees.  See Gersen, supra note 33, at 1720–21 (arguing that Mead implicitly 
embraced this approach). 
 62. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490–91 
(1992) (introducing the concept of linking a rule’s binding effect on the court to the 
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to determine deference bears a striking resemblance to the scholarly 
proposal of using procedure to determine binding effect. 
Professor David Franklin has criticized the approach of tying 
procedure to binding effect, referring to it as the “short cut.”63  The 
short cut focuses more on the legal effect of an agency’s rule in court 
than the legal effect of a rule on the public.64  The obvious pitfall to 
the short cut is that agencies can label a rule interpretive and 
circumvent notice and comment, while enforcing the interpretation 
on the public as if it were binding.65  The public could always appeal 
the application of a particular interpretation in court at a later date, 
but appeals of interpretations are rare and costly.66  Proponents of 
the short cut argue that it will require all rules to undergo scrutiny, 
either during the notice-and-comment process or upon appeal.67 
In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,68 the Supreme Court 
moved towards adopting the short cut.  The Court addressed whether 
a regulation the agency labeled “interpretive” should be considered 
legally binding in court.69  The Court concluded that because the 
“interpretation” affected individual rights and obligations, and 
because the agency issued it using notice-and-comment procedures, it 
should be considered binding in court.70  By concluding that 
regulations issued through notice and comment are more likely to be 
binding in court, the Court moved closer to adopting the short cut. 
Further confusion arises out of the continued use of the deference 
established in Auer v. Robbins71 after Mead.72  Auer deference—given to 
                                                          
procedure used to issue the rule); Gersen, supra note 33, at 1719 (re-exploring the 
theory that rules should only be binding if issued using notice and comment through 
the lens of Hoctor). 
 63. Franklin, supra note 11, at 279. 
 64. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 354–56 (calling this approach “ex post 
monitoring”). 
 65. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 308–12 (espousing the hazards of the short 
cut). 
 66. See id. at 310 (explaining that “[d]octrines such as standing, finality, ripeness, 
and nonreviewability of agency inaction combine to make it very difficult to obtain 
judicial review of . . . agency pronouncements”). 
 67. See Elliott, supra note 62, at 1491 (arguing that the traditional and short-cut 
approaches have roughly equal opportunities for public scrutiny). 
 68. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 69. Id. at 171–72. 
 70. Id. at 172–74. 
 71. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  In Auer, sergeants and a lieutenant in the St. Louis 
Police Department challenged the application of the Department of Labor’s 
regulation establishing a “salary-basis test,” which indicates that an employee is 
exempt from overtime pay protections in the Fair Labor Standards Act if the 
employee receives pay on a salary basis.  Id. at 455.  The Secretary of Labor submitted 
an amicus brief interpreting its “salary-basis test” as applying to the employees in 
question.  Id. at 461–62.  The Court followed the interpretation of the Department of 
Labor’s regulation in the Secretary’s brief, and in the process granted the 
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agencies’ interpretations of their own rules—is the strongest 
deference that courts grant to agencies.73  Auer deference deems an 
agency’s interpretation of its regulations to be “controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”74  Application 
of this degree of deference seemingly contradicts Mead, which held 
that courts typically grant the lesser Skidmore deference to rules that 
are not issued through notice and comment.75  The Supreme Court 
reconciled Mead and Auer in Gonzales v. Oregon,76 granting Skidmore 
deference to the regulatory interpretation in that case.77  The Court 
distinguished Auer from Gonzales because the interpreted regulation 
in Auer “gave specificity to a statutory scheme,” while the regulation 
in Gonzales was nearly identical to the statute.78  Thus, the Court 
grants a high degree of deference to interpretations of specific 
regulations, and less deference to interpretations of vague 
regulations or regulations that merely repeat the statute.79 
By making courts’ deference dependent on the procedure that 
agencies utilize in issuing the interpretation, courts have begun to 
assign legal effect based on procedure.  Assigning legal effect based 
on procedure may overlap with determining whether a rule is 
legislative because deference level and binding legal force are 
similar.80 
                                                          
interpretation significant deference because it was not “clearly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”  Id. 
 72. E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (recognizing Auer 
deference after Mead). 
 73. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1142 tbl.15 (2008) (presenting a study indicating that courts uphold 
an interpretation under Auer deference 91% of the time, while only upholding 
agency action around 70% of the time under all other levels of deference). 
 74. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001). 
 76. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 77. See id. at 255–57 (specifying that Auer deference is granted to interpretations 
of legislative rules promulgated under congressional authority to issue rules “carrying 
the force of law,” while all other interpretations receive Skidmore deference). 
 78. See id. at 256–57.  The statute in question, the Controlled Substances Act, 
allowed prescription drugs for “currently accepted medical use,” requiring a “valid 
prescription” that is issued for a “legitimate medical purpose.”  Id.; see 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 812(b), 829(c), 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006).  The regulatory language being 
interpreted included similar phrasing:  “legitimate medical purpose” and “course of 
professional practice.”  21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2011). 
 79. Compare Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256–58 (providing weaker Skidmore deference to 
the interpretation because the underlying regulation merely restated the terms of 
the statute itself), with Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (providing stronger Auer deference to 
the interpretation because the underlying regulation instituted a “salary-basis test” 
the Court considered a “creature of the Secretary’s own regulations,” implementing 
the underlying Fair Labor Standards Act). 
 80. Courts have even articulated degree of deference as whether an 
interpretation is binding on the court.  See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 
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C. Procedural Ossification Under the Alaska Hunters Doctrine 
While the Supreme Court was blurring the line between deference 
and the binding nature of agency rules, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit was imposing additional procedural 
requirements on agency rulemaking.  Since Vermont Yankee, 
procedural ossification of agency rulemaking has taken the form of 
requiring notice and comment where the APA does not explicitly 
require it by narrowly defining an exception81 or imposing additional 
requirements in the notice-and-comment process.82  One of the most 
controversial of these judicial constructions is the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine.83 
In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.84 and Alaska 
Professional Hunters Ass’n v. FAA,85 the D.C. Circuit held that an agency 
can only adjust certain interpretive rules of regulations after notice 
and comment.86  Citing dicta in Paralyzed Veterans,87 the court in 
                                                          
551 U.S. 158, 172–74 (2007) (using the fact that the interpretation was issued 
through notice and comment as a factor in determining if it was binding in court); 
Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238–39 (2004) (“[I]n 
determining whether Regulation Z’s interpretation of TILA’s text is binding on the 
courts, [the Court uses Chevron deference].” (emphasis added)).  Court 
determinations on whether an interpretation needed to be issued through notice 
and comment are based on whether the rule is binding on the public; and whether a 
rule is binding on the public is affected by the level of deference allotted to the 
interpretation. 
 81. See, e.g., Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting the government’s argument that the regulation at issue could be 
exempted from notice and comment under the agency management or personnel 
exception); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that notice and comment is required where there was a substantive 
value judgment for a procedural rule); infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Alaska Hunters doctrine). 
 82. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative 
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 536–37 (2000) (compiling additional notice-
and-comment procedures). 
 83. See Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion?  Inconsistent 
Interpretive Rules, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2000, at 16, 16–17 (arguing that the 
Alaska Hunters doctrine disrespects the interpretive rule exemption in § 553(b)(A)); 
William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1329–30 (2001) 
(stating that the Alaska Hunters holding is “difficult to justify”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 566–74 
(2000) (asserting that the Alaska Hunters doctrine was a mistake); Peter L. Strauss, 
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum:  Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential 
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 846–47 (2001) (calling the Alaska Hunters doctrine an 
“unsustainable formality”); Connolly, supra note 18, at 157 (contending that the 
Alaska Hunters doctrine makes interpretive rulemaking inflexible, thereby deterring 
agencies from issuing interpretations). 
 84. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 85. 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 86. See id. at 1034 (holding that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) could 
only deviate from the interpretive advice its local officials had given for over thirty 
years by issuing a rule through notice and comment); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 
586 (holding that the Agency’s interpretation of its own regulation did not require 
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Alaska Hunters held that “[w]hen an agency has given its regulation a 
definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that 
interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something 
it may not accomplish without notice and comment.”88 
In Alaska Hunters, the D.C. Circuit addressed a case where the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had changed its 
interpretation of the applicability of a pilot licensing regulation.89  
Local FAA officials had consistently informed hunting guides in 
Alaska that they could fly planes into hunting territory without 
obtaining a pilot license.90  Years later, after the Alaskan hunting 
industry had relied on this interpretation, the FAA changed its 
interpretation without notice and comment, requiring hunting 
guides to obtain pilot licenses.91  The D.C. Circuit ruled that the FAA 
could not change the longstanding and definitive interpretation that 
hunting guides did not need pilot licenses without issuing a new 
interpretation through notice and comment, even though the first 
interpretation was not issued through notice and comment.92 
To substantiate its holding, the D.C. Circuit cited relatively little 
authority.93  The court held that changing a definitive interpretation 
of a regulation is a constructive amendment to the rule itself, which 
requires notice and comment.94  The court also focused on the fact 
that Alaskan hunting operations had relied on local FAA officials’ 
regular advice in deciding to open up businesses in the area, and 
thus, that advice had become authoritative administrative common 
law.95  The court reasoned that its holding was justified by the need to 
                                                          
notice and comment because the interpretation was not sufficiently distinct or 
additive to the regulation). 
 87. See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (“Once an agency gives its regulation an 
interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the 
regulation itself:  through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.”). 
 88. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033–34 (citing Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 
F.3d 90, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586)). 
 89. Id. at 1031–33. 
 90. Id. at 1031–32. 
 91. Id. at 1032. 
 92. Id. at 1034–35. Not only had the first interpretation never been issued 
through notice and comment, it had never been documented in writing.  Id. at 1031–
32.  The initial interpretation was simply an understanding between local FAA 
officials and the hunting industry.  Id. 
 93. See id. at 1033–34 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006)); Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94–95; 
Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586. 
 94. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034. 
 95. Id. at 1035. 
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limit an agency’s ability to unfairly change the rules of the game 
when a company had relied on those rules.96 
The D.C. Circuit has since significantly limited the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine.  First, only a party who substantially and justifiably relied 
upon a previous interpretation can challenge an improperly issued 
adjustment to a regulatory interpretation.97  The reliance inquiry 
looks to whether the agency was bound by the interpretation and 
whether there was actual reliance.98  Second, the previous 
interpretation must be definitive and longstanding.99  The Alaska 
Hunters doctrine has since been cited with approval in some 
circuits,100 while other circuits have rejected101 or explicitly avoided 
it.102 
                         
 96. See id. (“Those regulated by an administrative agency are entitled to ‘know 
the rules by which the game will be played.’” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Holdsworth’s English Law, 25 LAW Q. REV. 412, 414 (1909))). 
 97. See MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(distinguishing the high level of reliance in Alaska Hunters from the low level of 
reliance in the case at issue); Devon Energy Corp. v. Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 
1040–41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that reliance on guidance documents was not 
enough to bind an agency when the guidance documents never had the force of 
law); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(finding that the plaintiff did not substantially rely on the Agency’s initial 
interpretation and that the Agency had not developed a final policy). 
 98. See, e.g., Devon Energy, 551 F.3d at 1040–41 (explaining that memoranda 
issued by low-level officials did not bind the Agency, and thus could not be justifiably 
relied upon). 
 99. See Commodity Carriers, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 434 F.3d 
604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that an interpretation is not definitive if the agency 
contradicts the interpretation); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 57–58 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that a definitive interpretation must be explicit). 
 100. See SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting Paralyzed 
Veterans outright); Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682 
(6th Cir. 2005) (supporting the Alaska Hunters doctrine in dicta only); Shell Offshore 
Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an interpretation 
of a regulation that contradicted a “long established and consistent practice” without 
notice and comment). 
 101. See Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling 
that agencies always have the authority to change regulatory interpretations if both 
the initial and subsequent rules constitute interpretive rules); Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 
1168, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (focusing only on whether a rule was interpretive or 
substantive and not requiring notice and comment for a change to a longstanding 
policy); see also Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 81–82 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding, prior 
to Alaska Hunters, that changes to a regulatory interpretation did not need notice and 
comment). 
 102. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1140–41 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (declining to rule on whether to adopt Alaska Hunters because it was 
inapplicable in a case involving an initial interpretation that was not determinative); 
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2009) (refusing to rule on 
whether the Alaska Hunters doctrine was valid because the plaintiff’s argument did 
not satisfy the requirements of an Alaska Hunters argument); Paragon Health 
Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1148 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the 
court need not address Alaska Hunters because it ruled that the initial and 
subsequent interpretations were actually consistent). 
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D. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
In Fox, the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) decision to forbid the broadcast of fleeting 
expletives.103  The Court avoided any constitutional free speech 
implications104 and instead reviewed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit’s holding that the FCC’s policy change was arbitrary 
and capricious.105  The FCC had changed its policy from allowing 
isolated expletives to a policy of considering the frequency of 
expletives as one factor in determining a broadcast’s legality.106  The 
Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the change was not arbitrary and 
capricious.107  Though the Fox holding has been described as further 
limiting judicial intervention in agency policy changes,108 it is not 
entirely clear which assertions in Fox carried the support of five 
Justices. 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion; Justices Thomas, Roberts, 
and Alito joined, while Justice Kennedy joined in part.109  Justice 
Scalia wrote that the APA does not distinguish original agency action 
from later action altering that policy.110  Justice Scalia provided a 
summary of his approach to arbitrary and capricious review of policy 
changes: 
[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation 
for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that 
it is changing position . . . .  And of course the agency must show 
that there are good reasons for the new policy.  But it need not 
demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new 
                         
 103. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 505 (2009). 
 104. Id. at 529.  The Supreme Court remanded the First Amendment issue back to 
the Second Circuit because the lower court had not definitively ruled on the 
constitutionality of the indecency policy.  Id. at 530.  On remand, the Second Circuit 
ruled that the indecency policy violated the First Amendment.  Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010).  However, this ruling was 
recently vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, which instead ruled that the 
indecency standard was void for vagueness.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012), remanded sub nom. to ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 475 F. App’x 796 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 105. Fox, 556 U.S. at 516. 
 106. Id. at 512. 
 107. Id. at 530. 
 108. See Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 573 (2011) (arguing that Fox heightened the ability for new 
administrations to change policy and deemphasized the importance of regulatory 
regularity). 
 109. Fox, 556 U.S. at 504.  Justice Kennedy did not join Part III-E of Justice Scalia’s 
decision, which is the section that refutes the dissents.  Id. at 523–29. 
 110. Id. at 515. 
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policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the 
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good 
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the 
conscious change of course adequately indicates.111 
However, Justice Scalia also wrote that agencies must provide a 
reasoned explanation if the change in policy contradicts factual 
findings used to make the previous policy, or if the prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests.112 
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.113  The dissent’s approach is similar to 
the majority’s approach, but has been differentiated as requiring a 
comparison between the old and new policies.114  However, Justice 
Breyer’s analysis does not always require a comparison.  Justice Breyer 
explains that “change is sometimes (not always) a relevant background 
feature that sometimes (not always) requires focus (upon prior 
justifications) and explanation lest the adoption of the new policy (in 
that circumstance) be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion.’”115  In fact, Justice Breyer explicitly states that a new 
justification need not be better than the previous policy.116  Justice 
Breyer’s analysis parallels Justice Scalia’s in stating that agencies 
should consider the major factors used to adopt the old policy when 
changing it.117  However, Justice Breyer argues that agencies cannot 
base a policy change solely on unchanged facts or factors known at 
the time the original policy was made.118  This last point is the 
principal difference between Justice Scalia’s and Justice Breyer’s 
opinions.119 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence travels the blurry line between the 
majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent.  As Justice Breyer 
                         
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 546–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114. See Levin, supra note 108, at 568 (stating that Justice Breyer’s dissent 
necessitated a “direct comparison” between policies). 
 115. Fox, 556 U.S. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Compare id. at 550 (arguing that an agency should have to explain why it now 
rejects the considerations that led it to adopt the prior policy), with id. at 515 
(majority opinion) (holding that a more reasoned explanation is required when, for 
example, an agency bases a new policy on factual findings that contradict those on 
which the prior policy was based). 
 118. Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 119. Compare id. (“[The Agency’s] explanation instead discussed several factors 
well known to it the first time around, which by themselves provide no significant 
justification for a change of policy.”), with id. at 515 (majority opinion) (stating that 
the Agency must provide further explanations for policies that conflict with prior 
findings, but not going so far as saying that an agency cannot ever base a policy 
change solely on factors considered during the initial policymaking process). 
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recognized in his dissent, Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Breyer’s 
assertions should be precedent where Justice Kennedy deviates from 
Justice Scalia and sides with Justice Breyer.120  Justice Kennedy 
explicitly “agree[d] with the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer that 
the agency must explain why ‘it now reject[s] the considerations that 
led it to adopt that initial policy.’”121  Justice Kennedy also 
acknowledged that reliance interests should be considered in the 
analysis.122  Like both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kennedy does not require an agency’s new policy to be “better,” but 
instead requires that a policy alteration be rational, neutral, and 
within the agency’s authority.123 
Justices Scalia, Breyer, and Kennedy largely agree on the standard 
used to determine if an agency’s policy change is arbitrary and 
capricious.124  Because Justice Kennedy asserts that an agency must 
explain why it rejected prior considerations, the Fox Court does in 
fact require an agency to explain “why” it changed policy.125  In 
explaining why, agencies should address or discount factual findings 
and other factors used in the original policy, as well as reliance 
interests created by the prior policy.126  Additionally, all Justices agree 
that this analysis is not based on any heightened standard due to the 
fact that the agency is changing a policy,127 but is instead a result of 
the general requirement that agencies cannot ignore facts or factors, 
whether they are new or were relied upon in prior policies.128  Thus, 
                         
 120. See id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s holding could in this 
respect significantly change judicial review in practice, and not in a healthy direction.  
But see, ante, at 535–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment).”).  Justice Kennedy’s decision is integral to understanding the precedent 
established in Fox because Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by five Justices 
including Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by four Justices, 
not including Justice Kennedy but carrying his support in certain statements. 
 121. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(alteration in original) (quoting id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 122. Id. at 536. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Levin, supra note 108, at 564 (identifying that the opinions are the same 
“up to a point”). 
 125. Fox, 556 U.S. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 126. Id. at 515 (majority opinion). 
 127. See id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the 
analysis of a policy change does not require a heightened standard (citing id. at 514 
(majority opinion))). 
 128. See id. at 515–16 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is not that further justification is 
demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is 
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered 
by the prior policy.”); id. at 552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FCC 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to consider important aspects of 
the problem, including some relied upon in the original policy). 
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though an agency’s analysis may have to be more in-depth for policy 
changes because the facts and factors to be considered would be 
more extensive, the Court recognized that the APA does not treat 
initial and subsequent agency actions differently.129 
II. FOX OVERRULED ALASKA HUNTERS SUB SILENTIO 
Fox overruled Alaska Hunters sub silentio by holding that the APA 
does not treat initial and subsequent agency actions differently.130  
Though the agency action in question in Fox was an adjudicative 
order, not a rule, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer phrased the 
entire decision using the broad terms “agency action” and “policy.”131  
There is no reason to restrict the Fox holding to adjudications 
because the Court’s language addresses all agency activities, 
including interpretive rules.132  Applying the holding in Fox to 
interpretive rulemaking, the APA should not distinguish initial 
agency interpretations of regulations from subsequent interpretations 
undoing or revising old interpretations.133  The extension of Fox to 
interpretive rulemaking is consistent with the clear language of the 
APA, which includes both the issuance and amendment of rules in its 
definition of “rulemaking.”134 
The Alaska Hunters doctrine establishes different procedural 
standards for initial interpretations of regulations and some 
subsequent interpretations of regulations.135  According to the 
doctrine, initial interpretive rules need not be issued through notice 
                         
 129. See id. at 515 (majority opinion) (“The [APA] makes no distinction . . . 
between initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that 
action.”); id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that, rather than imposing a 
“heightened” standard when changing a policy, the law “requires application of the 
same standard of review to different circumstances, namely, circumstances 
characterized by the fact that change is at issue”). 
 130. See id. at 515 (majority opinion); see also Levin, supra note 108, at 573 n.90 
(suggesting that Fox may have “ripple effect” implications for the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine).  Importantly, the Court never considered Alaska Hunters in Fox. 
 131. E.g., Fox, 556 U.S. at 515; id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 132. See id. at 515 (majority opinion); id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[P]resume that a legislature says in 
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). 
 133. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (establishing that no further justification is needed 
for policy changes but that a reasoned analysis might include additional 
considerations for policy changes). 
 134. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). 
 135. See Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (holding that once an agency establishes an interpretation of a regulation, any 
change to that interpretation must, like a change to the regulation itself, come 
through a notice-and-comment process). 
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and comment, while certain subsequent interpretive rules require 
notice and comment.136  Because the Alaska Hunters doctrine treats 
initial and subsequent agency actions differently, it was undermined, 
if not overruled, in Fox. 
Of course, the Court in Fox also asserts that arbitrary and capricious 
review of agency action can, in practice, differ from review of an 
initial action because there are inherent substantive differences 
between initial and subsequent actions.137  Agencies must analyze all 
reasonably considerable facts and factors when establishing policy, 
and the nature of those facts and factors differ depending on 
whether the action is initial or subsequent.138  Nonetheless, the Court 
in Fox held that initial and subsequent actions are reviewed using the 
same standard—in that case, arbitrary and capricious review.139  Thus, 
application of the APA’s standards may differ based on the 
circumstances and context, but the APA’s standards for initial and 
subsequent actions do not differ.140  Courts applying the Alaska 
Hunters doctrine interpret the APA as treating initial and subsequent 
agency actions—regulatory interpretations—with different 
procedural standards.  The Court rejected that approach in Fox. 
Given that the Fox Court rejected the Alaska Hunters approach, 
some might argue that agencies will be free to change regulatory 
interpretations at will, undermining regulated parties’ abilities to 
“know the rules by which the game will be played.”141  However, these 
critics could be appeased by applying the Fox Court’s arbitrary and 
capricious review to shifting interpretations of regulations. 
                         
 136. Id. 
 137. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (acknowledging that arbitrary and capricious 
analysis of policy changes should include some analysis unique to changes); id. at 
552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). 
 138. See id. at 515 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. at 513. 
 140. See id. at 514–15 (rejecting a per se heightened standard for changing prior 
rules but articulating the circumstances in which the APA requires a more searching 
analysis for agency action). 
 141. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035 (citing Holmes, supra note 96, at 414).  For 
academic support of the Alaska Hunters doctrine, see generally Stephen M. Johnson, 
Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695 (2007); Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for 
Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917 (2006); and Ryan DeMotte, Note, 
Interpretive Rulemaking and the Alaska Hunters Doctrine:  A Necessary Limitation on Agency 
Discretion, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 357 (2004). 
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III. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW, AS REFINED IN FOX, IS A MORE 
EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT WAY TO POLICE CHANGES TO REGULATORY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Traditionally, the exemption for interpretive rules in the APA,142 
and the principle that interpretive rules have no binding effect, gave 
agencies discretion to change interpretations of regulations at will.143  
Courts used arbitrary and capricious analysis to limit this discretion.144  
The D.C. Circuit deviated from this approach with the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine, which limits the discretion of agencies by requiring notice 
and comment for changes of certain interpretations of regulations.145  
In Fox, the Court not only implicitly overruled the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine, it also provided a framework that could facilitate a return to 
the traditional approach—using arbitrary and capricious review to 
limit agency discretion in interpretive rulemaking. 
The Alaska Hunters doctrine provides the courts with a shield for 
defending against what Professor Robert Anthony has termed 
“spurious rules.”146  Spurious rules are interpretive rules, not issued 
through notice and comment, that interpret a vaguely written 
regulation with little underlying meaning.147  Spurious rules, 
Professor Anthony argues, should be considered independently 
binding because they provide the specific requirements needed to 
give effect to an otherwise vague legislative rule, thereby providing 
the appearance of legal force.148  These rules pose a real risk, as many 
agencies have developed a practice of issuing intentionally vague 
regulations, or regulations identical to a statute, leaving the real 
“binding” element up to later agency interpretations.149  By doing 
                         
 142. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006). 
 143. See Mark Seidenfeld, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY PRACTICE 1998–1999, at 105, 112 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2000) 
(recognizing this traditional principle). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033–34; supra Part I.C. 
 146. Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules:  
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 10 (1994). 
 147. Id. at 10–11.  Professor Anthony also recognizes policy statements that are not 
based on any regulation or legislation as “spurious.”  Id.  However troubling this 
development may be, it is not relevant to this Comment. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar.  Congress passes a broadly worded 
statute.  The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended 
phrases, ambiguous standards and the like.  Then as years pass, the agency issues 
circulars or guidance memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often 
expanding the commands in the regulations . . . .  Law is made, without notice and 
comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal 
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.”).  The court in Appalachian Power 
believed that it found a spurious rule.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
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this, agencies maintain the flexibility to change a rule, but circumvent 
the public’s ability to participate in the rulemaking process.150 
The arbitrary and capricious review in Fox can replace the Alaska 
Hunters doctrine’s limitation on agency discretion to change 
regulatory interpretations by allowing review of each interpretive 
adjustment during litigation.  Under Fox, a court would require (1) 
an adequate explanation of why the agency changed interpretations, 
(2) a justification for contradicting or disregarding facts or factors 
considered in the previous interpretation, and (3) an indication that 
the agency considered reliance interests.151  To withstand judicial 
review, agencies would publish limited explanations of changes to 
regulatory interpretations, addressing the above three considerations.  
These safeguards are more consistent with the APA and Supreme 
Court case law than the Alaska Hunters doctrine.  Additionally, the 
safeguards are more efficient at limiting the typical abuses of 
interpretive rulemaking than a notice-and-comment requirement. 
A. Fox Is More Consistent with the APA than the Alaska Hunters Doctrine 
Unlike the Alaska Hunters doctrine, applying the arbitrary and 
capricious review in Fox to agency changes to regulatory 
interpretations is consistent with the plain language of the APA.  
Section 553(b)(A) exempts interpretive rules from notice-and-
comment procedures.152  This exemption should include changes to 
interpretive rules because the APA includes amendments to rules in 
its “rule making” definition.153  Thus, amendments should be subject 
to the same procedures as initial rules, and all interpretive rules, 
including amendments, are exempt from notice and comment. 
                                                          
issued a rule through notice and comment that directed state permitting agencies to 
condition permits for regulated entities on “periodic monitoring.”  Id. at 1018.  The 
EPA later issued an interpretation of that regulation, asserting that the periodic 
monitoring regulation required enough monitoring to ensure compliance with 
pollution standards.  Id. at 1025.  The court set aside the guidance document 
because it expanded the monitoring requirement beyond the meaning of the 
regulation.  Id. at 1028 (citing Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034). 
 150. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the 
main purpose of notice and comment is to ensure public participation after policy 
making authority is delegated to unrepresentative agencies). 
 151. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of these 
three factors). 
 152. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006). 
 153. Id. § 551(5); see Pierce, supra note 83, at 567 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit 
looked only to § 551(5) and failed to consider the interpretive rule exemption in 
§ 553(b)(A)). 
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The D.C. Circuit seems to read the APA differently.  It considers a 
long-standing interpretation to be a part of the regulation itself.154  
Thus, amending the interpretation is akin to amending the legislative 
rule itself, an act that requires notice and comment under § 553.155 
Interpreting the APA to equate an amendment of an interpretive 
rule with amending the underlying legislative rule undermines the 
distinction between interpretive and legislative rules.  By holding that 
a regulatory interpretation has become a part of the legislative rule, a 
court essentially accepts the interpretation as binding.156  This 
fundamentally undermines the distinction between interpretations 
and legislative regulations because it acknowledges that 
interpretations of regulations can be as binding as legislative 
regulations.157 
Relative to the shaky statutory foundation of the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine, applying the arbitrary and capricious analysis used in Fox to 
regulatory interpretations would be statutorily sound.  The section of 
the APA referring to judicial review, § 706, states that “[t]he 
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”158  
Congress intended courts to use arbitrary and capricious analysis to 
restrict “abuse[s] of discretion.”159  Because interpretive rules are 
exempt from notice and comment, interpretations are left to agency 
discretion.160  Under § 706, abuse of agency discretion can be held 
unlawful if arbitrary and capricious.161 
The Fox Court reiterated that when changing policies, agencies 
should engage in certain reasoning that would not otherwise be 
                         
 154. See Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034 (“When an agency has given its regulation 
a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the 
agency has in effect amended its rule . . . .”); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena 
L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the adoption of a new 
interpretation of a regulation is akin to amending the regulation); Richard W. 
Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 923 (2006) 
(recognizing the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Alaska Hunters doctrine as 
linking a long-standing interpretation to the legislative rule). 
 155. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 156. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA:  Sometimes They Just 
Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 3–11 (1996) (arguing that courts should perform 
independent review of agency interpretations because any level of deference has the 
effect of making interpretations binding). 
 157. See Connolly, supra note 18, at 172–74 (asserting that the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine erodes the difference between legislative and interpretive rules). 
 158. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. § 553(b)(A). 
 161. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
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necessary for initial policy decisions.162  Applying Fox to changes in 
regulatory interpretations means review of any change will look to 
reliance interests, a description of why the agency changed, and 
contradictions with any facts or factors considered in the previous 
policy.163  The APA does not preclude consideration of these issues; in 
fact, § 706 states that courts should “determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”164  This broad 
language, on its face, grants courts wide authority to interpret agency 
actions, including regulatory interpretations of the agency 
regulations.165  Therefore, though the plain language of the APA 
conflicts with the Alaska Hunters doctrine, it does not preclude 
arbitrary and capricious review of amendments to interpretations of 
regulations. 
B. Fox Is More Consistent with Supreme Court Case Law than Alaska 
Hunters 
The Alaska Hunters doctrine has never been litigated before the 
Supreme Court, and Fox carries more authority because it is a 
Supreme Court decision.  Applying the Fox analysis to interpretive 
rulemaking is also more consistent with prior Supreme Court case 
law, an indication that the Supreme Court might overrule the Alaska 
Hunters doctrine explicitly if given the chance. 
The Alaska Hunters doctrine conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Vermont Yankee.  In Vermont Yankee, the Court famously 
held that the APA provides the maximum level of procedural 
requirements that a court can impose on agencies.166  The Court held 
that the judiciary cannot overturn a rule because an agency’s 
procedures did not “ventilate” the issues; to invalidate a rule based on 
procedure, a court must find that the agency did not comply with a 
                         
 162. E.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) 
(establishing that agencies must at least acknowledge the policy change). 
 163. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (deriving these requirements 
from the Fox decisions). 
 164. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 165. See Anthony, supra note 156, at 9 (arguing that courts should not abdicate 
their authority to interpret agency regulations by deferring to agency 
interpretations).  Despite the Supreme Court’s history of strong deference to agency 
decisionmaking, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), even it has acknowledged that courts should usually grant agencies less 
deference where, like in interpretive rulemaking, the agency opinion is issued 
without notice and comment, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 
(2001). 
 166. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 523, 544–45 (1978) (holding that a court may only invalidate a rule due to 
procedural inadequacies if an agency failed to comport with statutorily established 
procedures). 
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statutory procedure established in either the APA or a governing 
statute.167  Accordingly, a court cannot impose notice-and-comment 
procedures when the APA would not require those procedures.168  
The Alaska Hunters doctrine requires notice-and-comment 
procedures for some interpretive rules—a requirement not found in 
the APA. 
Arbitrary and capricious review of changing regulatory 
interpretations would also establish procedures that the APA does not 
explicitly require.  The APA does not explicitly require agencies to 
include any basis of reasoning or purpose when publishing 
interpretive rules.169  If a court applied the arbitrary and capricious 
review in Fox to agency interpretations, agencies would have to 
provide such a statement of reasoning and purpose alongside the 
interpretation to facilitate that review.170  This could be considered an 
additional procedure because an agency would be required to 
publish more than just the interpretation itself. 
The Supreme Court considered this very issue in Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.171  In LTV Corp., the Court was forced to 
reconcile Vermont Yankee with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe,172 which imposed a procedural arbitrary and capricious 
requirement that agencies provide an explanation of agency policy 
positions before arguing the positions in the courtroom.173  The 
Court recognized that requiring an agency to explain its actions at 
the proper time in order to facilitate judicial review was an exception 
to Vermont Yankee.174 
Again, the Fox standard requires an adequate explanation of why 
an agency changed policy, a justification for contradicting or 
disregarding facts or factors considered in the previous policy, and 
consideration of reliance interests.175  Applying these requirements to 
changes in regulatory interpretations, an agency would have to 
                         
 167. Id. at 540–45. 
 168. Id.; see supra Part III.A (discussing how the Alaska Hunters doctrine is not 
explicitly established in the APA). 
 169. Alternatively, legislative rulemaking requires a “general statement of . . . basis 
and purpose.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 170. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (establishing that Fox requires 
these considerations and explanations). 
 171. 496 U.S. 633 (1990). 
 172. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 173. See id. at 419 (prohibiting post hoc courtroom rationalizations and providing 
that certain additional explanations can be required to facilitate judicial review). 
 174. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 655 (“[U]nlike in Overton Park, the Court of 
Appeals did not suggest that the administrative record was inadequate to enable the 
court to fulfill its duties under § 706 [arbitrary and capricious review].”). 
 175. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (analyzing the Fox opinions). 
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include these explanations and analyses with any altered interpretive 
rule,176 and thus would require procedures not explicitly included in 
the APA.177  However, like LTV Corp., Vermont Yankee would not bar a 
court from requiring these explanations because they are intended to 
facilitate judicial arbitrary and capricious review.178 
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Review Is More Consistent with the New 
Approaches for Distinguishing Between Legislative and Interpretive Rules 
Arbitrary and capricious review, as opposed to the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine, is more likely to survive the Supreme Court’s changing 
perspective on the distinction between legislative and interpretive 
rules.  The arbitrary and capricious analysis espoused in Fox fits with 
the evolving perspectives on the distinction between interpretive and 
legislative rules.  Though the degree of deference owed to regulatory 
interpretations is unclear, it is apparent that the Court is now 
focusing more on the issue of deference than whether an 
interpretation is binding on the public, and thus procedurally 
invalid.179  By focusing on substantive arbitrary and capricious review, 
a court could look to an agency’s Fox explanations, with whatever 
deference is required, to limit an agency’s discretion when changing 
regulatory interpretations.180 
By bolstering the substantive review of interpretive rules, courts can 
avoid the nebulous analysis of what is and is not a legislative rule; 
courts could simply establish that rules issued through notice and 
comment enjoy the deference granted to legislative rules, and that 
rules issued without notice and comment are granted the lesser 
                         
 176. See supra Part II (asserting that applying these requirements to interpretive 
rulemaking is reasonable because the Fox Court referred to “agency action” and the 
arbitrary and capricious standard applies to all agency actions, including interpretive 
rulemaking). 
 177. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (including no procedural requirements for 
interpretive rules). 
 178. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 654–55 (concluding that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard imposes a procedural requirement that agencies take whatever 
steps necessary to enable a court to evaluate the agency’s rationale). 
 179. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (analyzing an 
interpretive rule using a deference analysis instead of analyzing whether it was 
binding on the public).  Again, legislative rules that are binding on the public must 
go through notice and comment, and inversely, interpretive rules that do not go 
through notice and comment are not binding.  See supra notes 42–45 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 125–26 (establishing that Fox arbitrary and capricious review 
requires an agency to explain why it changed interpretations, justify contradicting 
facts or factors considered in the previous interpretation, and consider reliance 
interests). 
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deference given to interpretive rules.181  In essence, the process that 
an agency uses to issue a rule is less important as long as the decision 
is made after considering all of the issues and coming to a reasonable 
decision.  Professor Mark Seidenfeld recently argued for this 
approach, advocating for a “reasoned decisionmaking” review.182  The 
Fox analysis can provide a version of reasoned decisionmaking review 
by requiring explanations of agency changes after review of all of the 
issues. 
The Alaska Hunters doctrine has no place in this new regime, which 
defines a rule by its procedure, not by its effect.  In the new regime, 
amending a regulatory interpretation without notice and comment 
would place the action within the exemption in § 553; the 
interpretation could not be considered a part of the regulation 
because the lack of notice and comment would make it an 
interpretive rule.183  Additionally, defining an interpretive rule by its 
non-binding effect creates challenges because many regulatory 
interpretations are granted the higher Auer deference, establishing 
the highest level of deference and therefore increasing the likelihood 
that the interpretation will be upheld.184 
D. The Benefits of Using Substantive Review To Manage Agency Use of 
Guidance Documents in General 
Professor Seidenfeld argues for the use of a reasoned analysis 
review at the time a guidance document is issued.185  This approach 
would circumvent any doctrinal confusion over what is binding or 
which level of deference is appropriate, and would ideally replace 
many procedural restrictions.186  By focusing solely on the substance 
of guidance documents, courts can properly restrict an agency’s 
abuse of these documents, without decreasing efficiency via a 
protracted process.187  The Fox decision provides a framework for 
                         
 181. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 373–75 (arguing that substantive analysis can 
replace procedural review while providing a proper balance between the necessity of 
guidance documents and the necessity of restraining agency autonomy in issuing 
guidance documents). 
 182. Id. at 374. 
 183. See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text (describing the short-cut 
approach). 
 184. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 73, 
at 1142 tbl.15 (finding that courts uphold an agency interpretation under Auer 
deference 91% of the time). 
 185. Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 373. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 373–75. 
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substantive review that can be used to implement Professor 
Seidenfeld’s suggestions.188 
The doctrines of finality and ripeness, however, obstruct the full 
implementation of this approach because they could impede the 
immediate review of guidance documents.189  Some courts have 
concluded that a regulatory interpretation is not final and thus 
cannot be reviewed.190  Other courts have held that a regulatory 
interpretation’s lack of independent binding force exempts the 
interpretation from the general assumption of pre-enforcement 
ripeness.191  Neither of these obstacles should exist in a legal 
landscape that ties the appropriate level of deference to the binding 
nature of a rule. 
The appropriate level of deference could be determined at the 
time a rule is issued because the degree of deference is determined 
by an analysis of factors or events that occur before enforcement.192  
The probability that a rule will be upheld in court should be 
proportional to the degree of deference it is afforded.193  Because a 
                         
 188. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (analyzing the distinct factors 
considered in the various Fox opinions). 
 189. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 375–85 (acknowledging that some courts 
have refused to review agency interpretations before an enforcement action due to 
ripeness and finality, but providing examples where courts reviewed interpretations 
pre-enforcement).  The doctrine of finality generally requires agency action to be at 
its final stage before a court may review it.  See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 
(1997) (stating that agency action is only judicially reviewable if it is a consummation 
of the agency’s process, and if legal consequences will follow the agency 
determination).  Furthermore, claims challenging agency action must be ripe.  See 
Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (holding that an 
interpretive rule was not ripe because it did not impose immediate legal effects on 
the litigant due to the non-binding nature of legislative rules). 
 190. See, e.g., Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(describing a tentative agency letter as not final); Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Cntys. 
Dist. Adult Prob. Dep’t v. Dole, 948 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that an 
advisory interpretation was not final because it was subject to change).  But see 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
guidance document was final because it changed binding norms); Venetian Casino 
Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concluding that a 
guidance document amounted to final action). 
 191. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1967) (adopting a 
pragmatic approach that assumes pre-enforcement ripeness).  But see Seidenfeld, 
supra note 41, at 381 n.267 (providing cases that imply no pre-enforcement ripeness 
of guidance documents). 
 192. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171–73 (2007) 
(effect on rights and notice and comment); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 
(2006) (specificity of the interpretation); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 
(2002) (adequacy of the interpretive method). 
 193. In theory, the probability that a rule will be upheld in court should be tied to 
the deference it is afforded.  Studies indicate, however, that deference has little effect 
on whether a rule will be upheld, unless it is afforded Auer deference, which is 
associated with the highest probability that a rule will be upheld.  Eskridge & Baer, 
supra note 73, at 1142 tbl.15 (reporting that agency action is upheld 70% of the time 
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challenged rule is only truly binding on the public when a court is 
bound to apply the rule to the public, the level of deference a court 
gives an agency’s guidance document is directly related to the 
document’s binding effect on the public.194  In other words, when a 
court grants deference to a guidance document, it gives the 
document a level of binding force—undermining the justification for 
avoiding pre-enforcement review of guidance documents due to 
ripeness.195  Additionally, to hold that a guidance document cannot 
be challenged because it may not be applied to regulated parties is 
illogical; the very existence of a guidance document implies that an 
agency is at least planning to follow it.  Of course, agencies have 
prosecutorial discretion to apply an interpretation to a specific party, 
but considering that agencies have that same discretion when it 
comes to all interpretive rules, legislative rules, and even statutes, this 
is no basis for establishing differing finality or ripeness standards for 
guidance documents. 
Ripeness and finality issues aside, the Fox standard for arbitrary and 
capricious review can provide a reasoned analysis that can replace 
procedural objections to guidance documents.  The Supreme Court 
in Fox established a viable framework for substantive review by 
requiring an agency to explain why it changed interpretation, refute 
conflicting facts and factors used in the initial interpretation, and 
address reliance interests implicated by the change.196  In focusing on 
these three factors, the Fox standard requires an agency to sufficiently 
build the record to verify that it conducted a reasoned analysis.197 
E. The Problems with Compulsory Notice and Comment Under Alaska 
Hunters 
There is some limited evidence suggesting that compulsory notice 
and comment does not affect the resulting policy in a rule.  Assuming 
                                                          
under all but Auer deference, and that agency action is upheld 90% of the time 
under Auer deference).  Thus, if a regulatory interpretation is granted Skidmore 
deference, it will have the same probability of being upheld as a legislative rule, and 
if a regulatory interpretation is granted Auer deference, it will actually have a higher 
probability of being upheld. 
 194. Furthermore, some courts have begun discussing interpretive rules as 
binding on the court.  Supra note 80. 
 195. Anthony, supra note 156, at 3–11 (arguing that courts should grant 
independent review of agency interpretations because deference creates a binding 
effect). 
 196. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the factors 
analyzed in Fox review). 
 197. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 385 (arguing that arbitrary and capricious 
analysis should build the record for reasoned analysis). 
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this is true, the government burden of compulsory notice and 
comment could outweigh its benefits. 
At least one empirical study suggests that notice and comment is 
either minimally effective at limiting an agency’s discretion or 
redundant,198 making the Alaska Hunters doctrine either ineffective or 
unnecessary.  In a two-month study of federal regulations issued 
through notice and comment, Professor Stuart Shapiro found that 
72% of rules issued through notice and comment were substantively 
unchanged by the process.199  This means that of all federal agency 
actions carried out with notice-and-comment procedures, agencies 
only substantially changed the final rule after receiving comments 
28% of the time, implying that notice and comment rarely leads to a 
change in policy.200  A more pertinent study to the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine would focus on whether agencies change final rules after 
receiving comments when the notice-and-comment procedure was 
court ordered.  Presumably, when an agency voluntarily opts to send 
a rule through notice and comment when it is not required by the 
APA,201 the agency would be more open to adopting public 
comments.  When an agency sends a rule through notice and 
comment after having already attempted to avoid the procedure, it is 
probable that the agency would be less open to adopting comments, 
decreasing the chance that the procedure will further change 
policy.202 
Of course, limiting an agency’s discretion is not the only purpose 
of notice and comment.  Notice and comment provides notice to the 
public of proposed rules and creates a record for subsequent judicial 
challenge.203  It also ensures that the public has a chance to 
participate in the rulemaking process.204 
                         
 198. Stuart Shapiro, Two Months in the Life of the Regulatory State, ADMIN. & REG. L. 
NEWS, Spring 2005, at 12, 14 & tbl.4. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. E.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 35,102, 35,107 (proposed June 20, 2008) (to be codified at 
20 C.F.R. pt. 501) (acknowledging that the Department of Labor voluntarily 
provided the notice-and-comment opportunity despite the fact that the proposed 
changes were exempt from the APA).  This notice is one of many examples where an 
agency voluntarily posted a notice for comment to obtain information from the 
public. 
 202. A comparable empirical study suggests that when a rule is remanded, it does 
not typically stop the agency from eventually achieving its regulatory goals.  Jordan, 
supra note 11, at 413, 414 & tbl.2. 
 203. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(establishing that notice and comment is intended to allow the marshalling of 
opposition to a rule and provide a long record for judicial review). 
 204. See Johnson, supra note 141, at 735 (arguing for more public involvement in 
agency guidance). 
SHEARER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  1:00 PM 
2012] OUTFOXING ALASKA HUNTERS 197 
Arbitrary and capricious review under Fox can also provide these 
valuable benefits.  The requirements and explanations necessary to 
comply with the Fox standard would develop the administrative 
record.  Additionally, the public can participate in litigation where 
courts use the arbitrary and capricious standard to review altered 
interpretations.205  As for notifying the public of proposed policy 
changes, the thirty-day notice provided by notice and comment is 
probably not worth the increased government burden of undergoing 
the procedure.206 
Compulsory notice and comment is also ineffective because an 
agency can adopt an invalidated interpretation during adjudicatory 
proceedings.207  If a court invalidates an interpretative rule because it 
was not issued through notice and comment, the agency can adopt 
that interpretation during adjudication.208  To give substantive effect 
to the procedural violation, a court would then have to invalidate the 
regulatory interpretation independent of the interpretive rule.209 
The deference granted to an interpretation of a regulation 
provided by an agency during litigation should be similar to that 
granted to a regulatory interpretation issued without notice and 
comment.  If the Skidmore deference granted to interpretive rules is 
truly limited to the rule’s power to persuade,210 then it is not much 
different than the deference the court grants to any attorney; if a 
court is persuaded by an attorney, it will rule in that attorney’s favor.  
Just as courts will not defer to an agency’s “unsupported” position in 
                         
 205. Public participation through litigation is enhanced by the general 
assumption that litigants have pre-enforcement standing.  See Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–50 (1967) (providing a two-fold analysis for standing that 
favors pre-enforcement by looking to fitness of the issue for judicial decision and 
hardship to parties). 
 206. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006) (requiring agencies to issue final rules thirty 
days before the effective date). 
 207. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995) (concluding that 
an interpretive rule that might have otherwise been procedurally invalid was valid 
because the guidance document espoused an interpretation that the court would 
have independently upheld); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75 
(1969) (Black, J., concurring) (contending that the procedural invalidity of a rule 
did not bar application of the interpretation to the defendants in litigation); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 361–63 & n.160 (arguing that the preceding two cases 
establish that agencies can freely pursue interpretations through rulemaking or 
adjudication). 
 208. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90; Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 774–75 
(Black, J., concurring). 
 209. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 101–02 (upholding the litigation position 
after invalidating the identical interpretive rule); Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 774–75 
(Black, J., concurring) (same). 
 210. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  Regulatory 
interpretations are given the greater Auer deference when the interpretation is less 
spurious.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006). 
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litigation,211 neither should courts grant significant deference to an 
agency’s interpretive rule.212  Empirical evidence suggests that courts 
in fact do not provide differing levels of deference to cases 
warranting Skidmore deference and cases that the courts review de 
novo.213  Therefore, there is little doctrinal difference between the 
review of an interpretive rule and an interpretation advanced as a 
position in litigation. 
Though a court may preclude the retroactive application of a 
position in litigation that contradicts prior regulatory 
interpretations,214 this preclusion will not deter agencies from 
pursuing new positions in litigation.  Even if a court rules that an 
agency’s position in litigation cannot retroactively apply to the 
defendant, the position can be applied to subsequent defendants as 
precedent.215  Therefore, an agency would have little incentive to re-
promulgate an invalidated interpretive rule through notice and 
comment because successful litigation of that interpretation could 
accomplish the same goal by establishing precedent.216 
Given that notice and comment is relatively ineffective at 
restricting an agency’s discretion when changing regulatory 
interpretations, the Alaska Hunters doctrine’s net effect is regulatory 
delay.  The benefits of efficient governance outweigh the benefits of 
the Alaska Hunters doctrine.217  Using arbitrary and capricious review 
                         
 211. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (holding that 
the courts should not apply Chevron deference to an agency position in litigation that 
is unsupported by interpretations or regulations).  Bowen leaves open the possibility 
of applying the lower Skidmore deference to agency positions in litigation.  Also, a 
substantively valid position may receive deference under the Bowen framework 
because it would be supported by the underlying regulation.  Id. 
 212. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (establishing 
that the lower Skidmore deference, which requires an agency’s interpretation to be 
persuasive, is granted to interpretive rules). 
 213. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 73, at 1142 tbl.15 (concluding that courts 
uphold agency action around 70% of the time no matter whether the court applied 
Chevron, Skidmore, State Farm, or de novo deference).  This study supports the 
assertion that deference given to interpretive rules and interpretations asserted 
during litigation is the same. 
 214. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294–95 (1974) (holding 
that an agency could change a long-standing interpretation through adjudication, 
but that a new interpretation could not be retroactively applied to impose a 
substantial penalty); see also Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (applying a new interpretation issued during adjudication retroactively 
because the new interpretation is a new application of existing law, not a change in 
the law). 
 215. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75 (1969) (Black, J., 
concurring) (applying a litigation position to a defendant as precedent that, due to 
retroactivity, was not applied when the precedent was set). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See DeMotte, supra note 141, at 361–62 (arguing that the benefit of the Alaska 
Hunters doctrine is its ability to restrain discretion). 
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to limit an agency’s discretion to change its interpretations of 
regulations imposes a substantive limitation on agency discretion 
without delaying agency action. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on agency rulemaking is a 
confusing maze of contradicting definitions, levels of deference, and 
standards of review.  Unfortunately, the Alaska Hunters doctrine 
added to this confusion by making the procedure for changing 
regulatory interpretations unclear to both agencies and regulated 
parties.  Differing circuit doctrines on how regulatory interpretations 
can be issued further clog an administrative system that implements 
regulations on a national level.  Thankfully, the Supreme Court 
cleared up some of the confusion by overruling the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine sub silentio in Fox, bringing the nation closer to establishing a 
consistent and straight-forward procedure for issuing and amending 
interpretations of regulations. 
Applying the arbitrary and capricious review in Fox to interpretive 
rulemaking is more consistent with the APA, more consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s nebulous case law, and more efficient than the 
Alaska Hunters doctrine.  The Supreme Court took the first of many 
necessary steps toward alleviating ossification of agency rulemaking 
by overruling Alaska Hunters sub silentio.  The next step should be to 
simplify its own precedent on the binding effect of, and deference 
granted to, interpretive and legislative rules.  A simple regime of 
heightened deference (or binding effect) for rules issued through 
notice and comment, and the arbitrary and capricious review 
prescribed in Fox, would provide a much more manageable legal 
landscape.  Where an agency deviates from a past interpretation 
without notice and comment, arbitrary and capricious review could 
be facilitated by requiring an agency to issue the new interpretation 
with explanations on why it changed interpretations, why 
contradicting facts or factors were disregarded, and how reliance 
interests were considered.  The benefits of a less ossified rulemaking 
landscape using the Fox analysis would outweigh the minimal benefits 
of compulsory notice and comment under the Alaska Hunters 
doctrine. 
